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COVID-19 outbreak has become an unprecedented health, economic and 
social crisis. We build a theoretical model, based on which we develop an 
empirical strategy to analyze the drivers of the agility of policy response to 
the outbreak. Our empirical results show that government overconfidence in 
its own country capacity of health services and the intensity of expected 
economic costs from hard measures to manage the crisis delayed policy 
response. Contrarily, being a game against nature with incomplete 
information, increased knowledge and reduced uncertainty on other 
countries’ policy responses and on the epidemic development increased the 
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The coronavirus outbreak has produced an unprecedented health, economic, and social crisis, 
becoming a transboundary crisis as characterized in Boin (2019). As of mid-June 2020, more 
than 8 million cases have been diagnosed and more than 400,000 people have died, according 
to The Johns Hopkins COVID-19 tracker. Global leaders, such as Antonio Guterres (Secretary 
General of United Nations) or Angela Merkel (Chancellor of Germany), have compared its 
impact to the World War II. 
In a crisis, authorities must engage in coherent analysis under limited time, uncertainty, and 
intense pressure, searching for a proper response (Boin et al, 2005), and this has been the case 
for COVID-19 (van Dooren, forthcoming). In this vein, the rapid spread of the pandemic has 
forced countries to take unprecedented measures. More than 90% of the world’s population live 
in countries with restrictions on people arriving from other countries who are neither citizens 
nor residents, such as tourists, business travelers, and new immigrants, and many of them live 
in countries with borders completely closed to non-citizens and non-residents, according to the 
Pew Research Center (see Connor, 2020). Quarantine, social distancing, and isolation of 
infected populations can contain the epidemic. However, there is no clear consensus on the 
specific impact of each measure in terms of propagation mitigation (see, among others, Anderson 
et al., 2020; Prem et al., 2020; Koo et al., 2020), and few policy analyses related to COVID-19 are 
available in the literature so far. Among these, Moon (2020) analyzes the policy response in 
Korea; Gupta et al (2020) analyze behavioral responses to policies mandated in the US. Policy 
analysis related to COVID-19 is restricted given the provisional character and limitations of 
existing data (Stock, 2020; Rusell et al., 2020). Nonetheless, there is a widespread consensus 
among researchers and international organizations that early prevention and response are 
critical (Grasselli, Pesenti, and Cecconi, 2020). 
However, already available information allows analyzing what made some countries react 
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sooner than others. This is a relevant public policy issue, as the time dimension is central to 
crisis management, and policies applied by governments to deal with COVID-19 have followed 
distinct national rather than consensual international standards, as it happened with policy 
responses to previous epidemic crisis (Vallgårda 2007; Baekkeskov, 2016).  
In this paper we present a model to characterize the drivers of the reaction time to coronavirus, 
namely, the number of known diagnosed cases per million population (incidence rate) when the 
government approved hard contention measures (partial or complete lockdown). Our base 
model considers a rational government that cares about the population welfare and is 
conditioned by the level of information about the pandemic. Hence, the model includes three 
main factors: expected capacity of the health system to deal with the outbreak, expected 
economic costs of hard measures, and government’s level of information. We extend our 
analysis to account for emotional beliefs and biases affecting the assessment of the risk of the 
pandemic, and policy survival factors. 
We estimate an equation derived from our modeling. Using data from OECD and European 
countries, we find that the three of them are statistically relevant. First, the confidence of the 
government in its capacity to fight the outbreak, measured as the total healthcare expenditure 
per capita (PPP), is a significant delaying factor of policy response, and its weight is very 
important, as it accounts for a 30.5% of total delay. The higher the expenditure on healthcare, 
the more likely the government feels that can handle the outbreak; hence the longer the delay 
in response. According to our empirical estimation, each additional point of GDP spent on 
healthcare delayed hard measures up to increase by 16.91 the incidence rate when hard 
measures are announced. 
Regarding the prevention of economic costs, the more a country is exposed to globalization and 
international trade, the more it is (relatively) affected by implementing hard measures, such as 
border closures. We use total trade (% GDP) and total travel and tourism contribution to GDP 
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as proxies for the expected cost of hard measures. Both are highly significant and together 
account for 45.8% of the total predictive power of the model. As expected, the higher the cost, 
the slower the reaction: on average, a 10% increase in trade and tourism contribution increased 
by 26.79 the incidence rate at the time of hard measures adoption. 
To represent the level of information, we use the number of countries that have taken hard 
measures before the pandemic started in the government’s own country. As expected, countries 
whose first case was after other countries implemented lockdowns, anticipated their responses. 
Level of information shows important influence, being responsible for 18.6% of the explanatory 
power of the model. Regarding emotional or perception factors, proximity bias -represented by 
the distance from Wuhan to the capital city of the country- accounts for 5.2% of the total 
explanation of the delay in response, although its statistical significance is weak. Finally, we 
extend our analysis by testing several variables related to values and ideological biases, and the 
political survival hypothesis, but we do not find any systematic role for these factors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we outline a theoretical framework to model 
the velocity of response to the COVID-19 outbreak and formulate empirical predictions 
expected according to our model. In section three we discuss the data. Section four presents the 
empirical results from our base equation. Section five extends the analysis by considering 
several additional hypotheses. Next we conduct robustness checks. Finally, we draw the main 
conclusions and discuss some policy implications.  
Modeling the decision of the policy response to the crisis outbreak 
Next we present a theoretical model that builds the foundations of the empirical strategy that 
we follow later to analyze the drivers of the agility of policy response. 
Let ρ be the transmission rate of the virus under no contention measures and d its death rate. 
The strategies to fight the outbreak can be modelled as a sequential decision process with 
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incomplete information. In every time period, the government can decide either to take hard 
measures to contain the virus or to take soft measures. If the government takes soft measures 
(SM) at time t, transmission rate is reduced to 𝜌 = 𝛿 𝜌 . If it takes hard measures, then it loses 
π units of utility (lost production) but reduces transmission rate to 𝛿 𝜌 , with 𝛿 <  𝛿 < 1.  
Let 𝑛  be the number of infected people at the end of time t − 1. At the beginning of period 
t, they infect 𝜌 𝑛  people, and then they are treated. Let us note by c the capacity of the 
healthcare system. If 𝑛 < 𝑐, then no infected population die at t and all get cured. Otherwise, 
the number of fatalities at t is 𝑓 = 𝑑(𝑛 − 𝑐), and the rest get cured. 
Let us consider a 4-period process, as the one represented in Figure 1. At t = 0, nature determines 
an initial number of infected people n0 and the transmission rate ρ. At t = 1, infected people 
transmit the virus to others and then get treated. Therefore, 𝑛 = 𝜌𝑛 , and the number of dead 
people at t = 1 is 𝑓 = 𝑑 max {𝑛 − 𝑐, 0}. The government gets an estimation of the transmission 
rate 𝜌 = 𝜌 and of the total number of infected people,  𝑛 .  Based on that information, the 
government estimates the expected transmission rate, death rate and capacity for the following 
periods (𝜌 = 𝐸 (𝜌 ), 𝑑 = 𝐸 (𝑑 ), ?̂? = 𝐸 (𝑐 )) and decides whether to take soft 
or hard contention measures. The process goes like this until t = 4, where a vaccine is 
discovered, and propagation goes to 0. Figure 1 represents how the government expects that the 




Figure 1: Representation of the 4-periods decision process with government expectation of transmission 
rates and number of infected people at t = 1. 
 
Let us note by 𝑓 (𝑛 ) = 𝑑 max {𝑛 − ?̂? , 0} the expected fatalities at time t+i, given the 
expectations of the death rate and the capacity, and by l the cost per fatality. Then, the expected 
cost at t = 1 of the different strategies that the government can take are: 
𝐸𝐶(𝐻𝑀, 𝐻𝑀) = 𝑙 𝑓 (𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌 (𝛿 ) 𝑛 ) + 2𝜋                          (1) 
𝐸𝐶(𝐻𝑀, 𝑆𝑀) = 𝑙 𝑓 (𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝛿 𝑛 ) + 𝜋                              (2)    
𝐸𝐶(𝑆𝑀, 𝐻𝑀) = 𝑙 𝑓 (𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝛿 𝑛 ) + 𝜋                              (3)  
𝐸𝐶(𝑆𝑀, 𝑆𝑀) = 𝑙 𝑓 (𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌𝑛 ) + 𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 (𝛿 ) 𝑛 )                                        (4) 
  
 
First, notice that EC(HM, SM) ≤ EC(SM, HM), with strict inequality if under soft measures the 
healthcare system collapses. Delaying the adoption of hard measures is a weakly dominated 
strategy if the government expects a collapse. Therefore, under the assumption of rationality, 
the only reason for governments that took hard measures not to take them before was a risk 
underestimation or an overconfidence in their capacity. The latest reasoning is consistent with 
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the offsetting behavior hypothesis, put forward by Peltzman (1975), which implies that risk is 
compensated: agents adjust behavior in response to the perceived level of risk, and behave less 
carefully if they feel more protected. This hypothesis has been tested frequently, for instance, 
in car safety analysis (Chirinko and Harper, 1993; Peterson, Hoffer and Millner, 1995). 
Second, let us analyze what determines whether the government decides to take hard measures 
or soft measures. The dynamics of governments action or inaction during crises do not imply 
that action is always beneficial or functional (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). Hence, 
governments and managers consider costs and benefits from action (Comfort, Waugh and 
Cigler, 2012). The government will apply hard measures (at least one time) if and only if the 
expected costs (economic and fatality related) are lower than those cost of soft measures. It is 
sufficient to compare the case when the government applies once the hard measures. 
Noting by ∆C the difference between EC(HM, SM) and EC(SM, SM), we have that: 
𝛥𝐶 = 𝑙  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) +  𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝛿 𝑛 ) − 𝑓 (𝜌 𝛿 𝑛 ) −  𝑓 (𝜌 (𝛿 ) 𝑛 ) + 𝜋                                   (5) 
The higher the lost production due to hard measures, π, the lower the incentives for the 
government to take hard measures, since ∆C increases as π increases. Note also that fatality 
costs will be positive only if the government believes that the system will collapse under soft 
measures. In that case, the incentive to take hard measures increases. 
Third, let us notice that even if the system collapses, the government may decide not to take 
hard measures. Let us assume that the system will collapse under soft measures at t = 3 and t = 
4 but it won’t at any moment under hard measures. Then: 
 





The government will take hard measures if and only if the total number of fatalities times the 
cost per fatality is higher than the penalty cost of the hard measures. Therefore, the larger the 
game (other things equal), the higher the probability of hard measures. Moreover, since the 
duration of the pandemic was not certain, the expectations about its duration may be itself a key 
parameter that modifies government reaction: the more pessimistic about the duration, the more 
likely to take hard measures before. 
In all, the theoretical description of the decision process allows identifying two main insights. 
First, the decision of which strategy to follow depends on the seriousness of the pandemic and 
the economic and fatality costs expected by the government. Therefore, governments may 
behave rationally even if they decide to follow different strategies because they may be facing 
different expectations of associated costs. Secondly, conditioned to expecting of a healthcare 
collapse, anticipating hard measures is strictly better than delaying the response. Hence, 
governments that were forced to take hard measures once the number of diagnosed cases 
escalated would have been better off if they had anticipated the policy response. 
Variables, data and sources 
Sample  
In order to ensure certain homogeneity between countries, we have considered for our model 
the 36 OECD countries. We also provide a robustness check increasing the sample with the five 
EU states that do not belong to OCDE (Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Malta and Hungary) and 
four countries that are candidates to adhesion to EU (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia 
and Serbia). Next we explain the variables we use based on our theoretical model, how we 
specify them and sources from which we obtain the information. 
Variables   
Incidence rate at policy response: We define the incidence rate at policy response as number 
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of cases (according to the John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center) adjusted per total 
population when the government began implementing hard measures. This variable captures 
the time the government waited until taking hard measures. Hard measures are those that 
severely restrict free movements of citizens (partial or total lockdowns): closing borders, 
closing schools, universities and public places, prohibiting public events and public gatherings, 
closing most or all non-essential shops, curfews, and forcing work at home. To establish a 
homogeneous criterion, at least two of these measures needed to be in place for a country to be 
considered as implementing hard measures. Table A-1, presents which action has been 
considered as the first hard action for each country.  Data was obtained from the IMF database 
of policy response to COVID-19 (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-
Responses-to-COVID-19), the Think Global Health timeline (www.thinkglobalhealth.org/) and 
complemented with official government websites and press briefings. 
Fatality costs and health capacity to fight the outbreak: We use total healthcare resources per 
capita in 2017 (purchasing power parity - ppp), last available year, as a proxy of the level of 
confidence in the own capacity to overcome the outbreak, thus containing the fatality costs. 
Data on healthcare expenditure per capita (ppp) has been obtained from the World Bank 
database (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PP.CD). While nominal 
expenditure could be strongly associated to different costs, using ppp-adjusted allows 
controlling for cost differences. In any case, we check our results by using an alternative 
variable, the healthcare expenditure as a percentage of the GDP, which is a relative measure. 
According to the offsetting behavior hypothesis (Peltzman, 1975), we expect that a stronger 
capacity of the health services will be negatively associated with agile policy response. 
Economic costs: Governments consider costs and benefits from policy. Hard measures to 
confront COVID19 crisis, due to their intrinsic characteristics, slowdown business activity thus 
creating damage to the economy. Trade and tourism are two activities particularly damaged by 
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measures involving strong restrictions on mobility. Hence, we approach the relevance of 
economic costs with two indicators: total travel and tourism (direct and indirect) contribution, 
and total trade (imports and exports), both as % of total GDP in 2018. Both indicators are 
obtained from the World Bank Database (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS, https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/tnt.tot.contrib.gdp). Our 
expectation is that the higher the economic costs of adoption of hard measures the less agile is 
the government adopting them.  
Uncertainty and information: We use as main indicator for the level of information of a 
government, the total number of countries that have announced or are already implementing 
hard measures when the government starts dealing with the pandemic (first case diagnosed 
within the country). We also use an alternative proxy: the number of days between the first 
lockdown (Hubei, 23th January 2020) and the first case within each country. More time elapsed 
since the eruption of the crisis allows governments to adjust responses and reduce the risk of 
problems such as cognitive overload or panic (Moynihan, 2008). Hence, countries whose first 
case occurred later should have had more accurate information and more cognition of the risk. 
This allows policymakers to lessen the gap between planning and practice (Comfort, 2007). 
Therefore, we expect them to act relatively faster, because they had available more and better 
signals calling for urgent action before reaching higher level of criticality (Farazmand, 2007). 
Table 1 displays the description of the variables and their sources. Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics. Table A-2, in appendix, displays the correlation matrix. 
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Table 1. Variables: Description and sources 
 Description Source Hypothesis 
Dependent variable    
Incidence rate The number of cases adjusted per 
total population when the 
government began implementing 
hard measures. 
IMF & Think 
Global Health 
 
Covariates    
Health Expenditure 
per capita (ppp) 
Logarithm of total healthcare 
expenditure per capita in 2017 
(ppp). 
World Bank  αj > 0 
Tourism Logarithm of total travel and 
tourism contribution to GDP. 
World Bank  αj > 0 
Trade Logarithm of total trade (imports 
and exports) as % GDP. 
World Bank  αj > 0 
Previously locked 
countries. 
Total number of countries that had 
begun to have implement hard 
measures when the pandemic hits 
the country. 
Own elaboration αj < 0 
Alternative covariates    
Health Expenditure % 
GDP  
Logarithm of the health 
Expenditure as % GDP 
World Bank αj > 0 
Days since Hubei 
lockdown  
Number of days between the first 
lockdown (Hubei, 23th January) 
and the first case within each 
country. 
Own elaboration  αj < 0 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Min Max Mean St Dev 
Incidence rate at policy response 0.0121 379.9037 68.1322 89.5308 
Healthcare expenditure (ppp) (LN) 6.9990 9.2790 8.2200 0.5231 
Tourism (LN) 1.4590 3.5440 2.2270 0.4751 
Trade (LN) 3.3140 5.9590 4.5250 0.5365 
LockedCountries 0.0000 8.0000 1.0280 1.4038 
Healthcare expenditure % GDP 1.4398 2.8367 2.1388 0.2728 
Days since Hubei lockdown (LN) -7 48 25.0556 17.0192 
 
 
Empirical model and results 
Our empirical analysis follows a three-step procedure. Firstly, we estimate a base model 
according to the theoretical model presented in Section two. Then, we discuss potential 
extensions of the model, by introducing new variables to capture additional effects, such as 
emotional and political biases. Lastly, we estimate a final model, present some robustness 
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checks, and the interpretation of the results. 
Our base empirical model is grounded on the theoretical model presented. The agility to take 
action (cases adjusted by total population when hard measures are implemented) is affected by 
the capacity of the healthcare system to avoid fatalities and reduce transmission rate, the costs 
of hard measures, and the information available to the government with respect the expected 
deaths of the pandemic and the transmission rate. As explained in the previous section, in order 
to capture these drivers, we use the following variables: healthcare expenditure per capita, 
tourism, trade, and previously locked countries. Therefore, we estimate a base model of the 
form: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒, 𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠)                        (7) 
 
Due to the non-negative discrete nature of the problem, a discrete modeling approach is the 
most suited. Thus, our empirical approach is done by using a GLM with Negative Binomial 
distribution. The negative binomial allows us to capture over and under dispersion, and 
therefore provides more robust estimates of the parameters and the standard errors than a 
Poisson distribution. We also adjust an alternative specification of the model by using OLS. In 
order to do so, we transform the target to the logarithm of the incidence rate. Although for a 
general discrete problem this approach may lead to non-normality of residuals and may not 
solve the relationship between variance and mean associated with counting problems (see, for 
instance, Long, 1997; Lindsey, 2000), in this case, after the transformation residuals can be 
considered normal (p-value for the Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.2020 and for the Anderson-Darling 
test is 0.1364) and homoscedastic (White test for heteroscedasticity yields p-value = 0.3346). 
The average variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.34 and no individual VIF is above 2. 
Table 3 presents the results using the two modeling techniques. Both methods yield similar 
estimation of the parameters. In both cases, the theoretical hypotheses cannot be rejected for all 
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parameters. Confidence on health capacity to deal with the crisis is associated with a higher 
incidence rate and, therefore, negatively associated with the agility of policy response. In this 
regard our result is consistent with the offsetting behavior hypothesis. Expectations of economic 
impact if hard measures are delayed are as well negatively related to the agility of policy 
response. On the contrary, increased information and reduced uncertainty as long as more 
countries have adopted hard measures are associated with a more agile policy response. 





















  Standard errors in brackets. Level of Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The negative binomial distribution avoids any transformation of the target and guarantees a 
proper fitting for a counting outcome without the assumption of normality of the residuals. 
Therefore, we take it as our base model. Next, we check what are the results when using the 
alternative specifications for health capacity (expenditure in % GDP) and level of information 





 Negative Binomial 
(1) 
   OLS   Robust 
(2) 
Intercept -35.9934*** -24.9476*** 




Tourism 1.7829*** 2.1120*** 
 (0.3093) (0.3863) 
Trade 1.4726*** 1.6882*** 
 (0.2763) (0.3976) 
Locked countries -0.6344*** -0.6611*** 
 (0.1362) (0.2382) 
N. Observations 36 36 
R-Squared  0.8167 
F-Test  5.188e-11*** 

































Both estimations using alternative specification for health capacity and level of information 
yield almost identical results as those we obtained with the base model -estimation (1)- (and the 
same happens if we run OLS Robust estimations, which results are available upon request). 
When the health capacity is measured in relative terms (estimation 3), goodness of fit is a bit 
lower, revealing that it is more relevant the absolute level of healthcare resources (adjusted by 
PPP) than the relative. When the level of information is measured as the days since Hubei’s 
lockdown (estimation 4), the level of significance goes to p<0.05 from p<0.01. Thus, 
governments incorporated more information by knowing other governments’ strategies than by 
any other means. 
 






Intercept -35.9934*** -28.375*** -38.8726*** 
 (3.2792) (3.2480) (3.2280) 
Healthcare capacity 
1.9031*** - 2.1684*** 
(0.3228) - (0.3399) 
Tourism 1.7829*** 1.4700*** 1.8666*** 
 (0.3093) (0.3563) (0.3389) 
Trade 1.4726*** 2.1681*** 1.5858*** 
 (0.2763) (0.3646) (0.3507) 
Locked countries -0.6344*** -0.8000*** - 
 (0.1362) (0.1776) - 
% GDP health (LN)  - 2.7408*** - 
 - (0.8381) - 
Days since Hubei b - - -0.0006** 
 - - (0.0003) 
N. Observations 36 36 36 
Residual/Null deviance 0.6830 0.4333 0.6301 
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Extension of the model: emotions, beliefs and policy survival  
Starting from our base model estimated with the negative binomial distribution (which avoids 
any transformation of the target and guarantees a proper fitting for a counting outcome without 
the assumption of normality of the residuals), in this section we test several additional 
hypotheses on emotional and political biases. Table 5 shows the results. 
Emotions  
Decision-making is highly influenced by emotions, especially when there is a lack of 
information (Kahneman, 2011), and Akerloff and Shiller (2009) pointed out that emotions play 
a relevant role in economics and are a key driver of market failures and financial crisis. 
Regarding emotional biases, two main indicators are considered. First, the greater the 
geographic proximity of the crisis, the greater its impact in terms of the incentives for policy 
action, including increased fear and attention (Nohrstedt and Weible, 2010). Hence, we consider 
the distance kilometers from Wuhan to the capital city of each country (source Google Maps 
API), as a proxy for geographic proximity bias, and we expect that the closer the country to 
Wuhan, the more agile the policy response. The variable is included as the logarithm of the 
distance to capture a concave dissipation effect. 
The second indicator corresponds to the gender of the Prime Minister. The discussion of 
whether female prime ministers have taken faster, and more executive action has been widely 
discussed (e.g. CNN, April 16, 2020; The Guardian, 25 April 2020). A possible explanation is 
that women are more risk averse than men, and place heavier weight on safety, which is 
consistent with Barnes and Beaulieu’s (2018) survey experiment on women and risk aversion. 
We specify the variable Gender PM as a dummy that takes value 1 for women and 0 otherwise 
(source official countries’ web pages). We expect female prime minister to be more agile in 
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policy response.  
Results show that the distance to Wuhan is a significant factor in the agility of policy response 
(estimation 5). The more distant to Wuhan the slower the reaction, consistent with the 
geographic proximity hypothesis. On the contrary, our variable for gender prime minister 
(estimation 6) does not make a significant difference in the agility of policy response. This 
result is consistent with that in Pondorfer, Barsbai and Schmidt (2017), who do not find actual 
gender differences on risk preferences, but find that this perception is rather based on 
stereotypes.  
 
  Table 5: Estimations of extensions of the base model 




 Base (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -35.9934*** -40.8394*** -36.7422*** -36.2375*** -39.4017*** 
 (3.2792) (3.5442) (3.6301) (3.2534) (3.0522) 
Healthcare capacity 1.9031*** 1.9096***  1.9949*** 1.8996*** 1.9630*** 
(0.3228) (0.3127) (0.3587) (0.3218) (0.2976) 
Tourism 1.7829*** 1.7696*** 1.8231*** 1.8861*** 1.7910*** 
 (0.3093) (0.3007) (0.3298) (0.3103) (0.2891) 
Trade 1.4726*** 1.4029*** 1.4540*** 1.4897*** 1.3906*** 
 (0.2763) (0.2710) (0.2759) (0.2748) (0.2571) 
Locked countries -
0.6344*** -0.6317*** -0.6156*** 
-
0.6949*** -0.5721*** 
(0.1362) (0.1326) (0.1361) (0.1449) (0.1197) 
Km from Wuhan  0.5734**    
 (0.2555)    
Gender PM   -0.1627   
   (0.3947)   
Ideology    0.1650  
    (0.1559)  
Days to election     0.4766* 
    (0.2756) 
Num.  observations 36 36 36 36 36 
Residual/Null 
deviance 




We consider the possibility that different ideologies or beliefs on the role of government can 
influence how crisis are viewed and managed (Dror, 1994). The effects of ideological and 
partisan differences in the management of COVID-19 crisis in the US have been extensively 
studied (see Barrios and Hochberg, 2020, for a review). We have specified a variable Ideology, 
in which we give a score from -1 (left) to 1 (right). Center parties are scored 0  (Main sources 
are the World Bank Database of Political Institutions 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions, and 
international alliances to which parties in government belong). We expect that left-wing parties 
will be more prone to agile policy response. From results of estimation (7) we observe that 
ideology has no significant influence on the agility of policy response to COVID-19 crisis.  
Policy survival and electoral competition 
The application of the logic of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003) to disaster 
management suggests that since voters punish governments for improper crisis response, risk-
averse governments will implement proactive policies, especially within highly competitive 
contexts and close to elections (Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2014). Among the expectations that 
these authors state, one is of especial interest for our research: the relationship of the policy 
response with the electoral cycle, suggesting that the closer the next election the most 
comprehensive the policy response (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). Based on these insights, 
we have tested one additional variable: the logarithm of the days to next election (source 
National Democracy Institute database https://www.ndi.org/ and countries’ official web sites), 
which measures the number of days between the first diagnosed case in the country and the 
next scheduled or expected relevant election date. The result we obtain (estimation 8) is 
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consistent with the hypothesis than the closer the next election, the more agile the policy 
response, although the significance is weak.  
It is worth noting that through estimations 5 to 8, all the variables in our base model keep the 
same sign and level of significance. Therefore, we can conclude that our basic results are very 
stable throughout all estimations we conducted in this section.  
Robustness check and final model interpretation 
In this section we conduct two robustness checks and the estimation of the final model. First, 
we check whether the base model and the significant extensions in sections four and five are 
robust to the inclusion of new countries. We introduce in the sample the five EU states that do 
not belong to OCDE (Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, and Hungary) and the four candidates 
to adhesion to EU (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) 
As results in Table 6 show, the base model is robust to the extension (estimation 9), as well as 
the proximity bias extension (estimation 10). However, the policy survival factor (estimation 
11) is not significant when including additional countries. 
 
Table 6: Robustness check including additional countries in the sample 
 Base (1) (9) (10) (11) 
Intercept -35.9934*** -34.0238*** -38.8302*** -33.9575*** 
 (3.2792) (2.6918) (3.3258) (2.6767) 
Healthcare capacity 1.9031*** 1.8557*** 1.8740*** 1.7595*** 
(0.3228) (0.2724) (0.2656) (0.2877) 
Tourism 1.7829*** 1.3832*** 1.3855*** 1.3655*** 
 (0.3093) (0.2675) (0.2617) (0.2685) 
Trade 1.4726*** 1.3172*** 1.2481*** 1.3233*** 







(0.1362) (0.1211) (0.1179) (0.1191) 
Km from Wuhan   0.5531*  
  (0.2751)  
Days to election    0.1119 
   (0.1519) 
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Second, we present an additional robustness check by conducting a Bayesian estimation of the 
model. Low sample size can lead to less robust estimation of parameters and standard errors, 
thus compromising the significance test of GLM, which relies on asymptotic properties of the 
estimators (Western and Jackman, 1994). We perform the Bayesian estimation using the brms 
package available in R (Bürkner, 2017), and using no prior to avoid introducing any bias. Since 
the days to election variable is not robust to the inclusion of additional countries, we only 
include the kilometers from Wuhan extension. As can be seen in Figure 2, all parameters are 
robust to the Bayesian estimation, but kilometers from Wuhan exhibits weak significance (p-
value 0.1234), due to certain skewness of the distribution. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the parameters of the model using a Bayesian estimation 
 
Finally, in order to gain a complete understanding of the model beyond the significance of the 
parameters, we estimate the relative importance of each variable included in the model. We use 
a new methodology for model interpretation suggested by Lundeberg and Lee (2017, 2019):  
SHAP (SHapley Additive ExPlanation) values. On synthesis, given an observation 𝑥 =
Num.  observations 36 45 45 45 
Residual/Null deviance 0.6830 0.6900 0.7067 0.6935 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Level of Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
19  
(𝑥 , … , 𝑥 ), the SHAP value of feature j on the instance x corresponds to how the concrete value 
of feature j on x modifies the output of the model with respect other instances that share some 
of the features with x but not j. For a parametric model 𝐹(𝑥) =  𝑔(∑ 𝛼 𝑥 ), where 𝑔 is a 
function of the weighted features of x, the SHAP value corresponds to: 𝜑 (𝑥) =  𝛼 (𝑥 −
𝐸 𝑋 )  where X is the set of observations and 𝐸(𝑋 ) is the average value of the j feature on X.  
Then, noting by N the total number of observations, we can estimate the relative importance of 
the feature j in the model as 
𝑅𝐼 =  
∑ |𝜑 (𝑥 )|
∑ ∑ |𝜑 (𝑥 )|
 
Table 7 presents the relative importance of each variable in the final model, estimated using the 
Bayesian approach. 
















 Bayesian estimate a Relative importance 
Intercept -40.2217***  
 (4.4631)  
Healthcare capacity 1.9090*** 30.45% 
(0.3878)  
Tourism 1.7920*** 24.72% 
 (0.3722)  
Trade 1.4036*** 21.04% 
 (0.3264)  
Locked countries -0.6233*** 18.59% 
(0.1845)  
Km from Wuhan 0.5040+ 5.20% 
(0.3258)  
Num.  observations 36  
Residual/Null deviance 0.7065  
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Level of Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1, 
+ p<0.15 
a The Reset test for functional form or omitted variables with a polynomial fitting of 
degree 4 does not reject the null hypothesis (p-value 0.3965). Therefore, the functional 




Conclusion and policy implications 
In this research we built a theoretical model, based on which we designed and implemented an 
empirical strategy to analyze the drivers of the agility of policy response to the COVID-19 
outbreak. We are aware that our identification strategy does not allow making strong claims of 
causal relations from our empirical results, which is a limitation of or research. However, we 
believe that our theoretical modelling provides some alleviation regarding that limitation. 
The empirical results we obtained show that overconfidence in the capacity of health services 
and the intensity of expected economic costs from hard measures to manage the crisis delayed 
policy response to COVID-19. Our results are empirically robust, and are also supported by 
frequent public statements made by political leaders, such as those by the Spanish Prime 
Minister Pedro Sánchez on March 10th and the French President Macron in the same day, both 
praising the robustness of their respective healthcare systems as the best possible preparation 
to fight the pandemic. Soon after, both governments had to adopt hard measures. Indeed, this 
overconfidence has been stated as one of the main causes of the delay in the policy response by 
global healthcare experts, such as Mr. Pedro Alonso, the Director of the World Health 
Organization Malaria Program, who stated on May 6th that Western pride prevented most 
advanced countries from reacting quickly. 
Increased information and reduced uncertainty on other countries’ policy responses and the 
development of the epidemic increased the agility of the country’s policy response. Being a 
decision process with incomplete information, variables related with additional information and 
valuation of risk are key and directly account for almost 25% of the total importance. 
All governments have been overflowed by the pandemic and have seen themselves being forced 
to take hard measures to avoid the materialization of a complete health system collapse and its 
associated fatalities, which would have resulted in a more negative valuation of the 
government's policy response.  According to our theoretical model, once a government has a 
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clear expectation that it will be necessary to take hard measures, taking them immediately 
strictly dominates delaying them. Hence, the fact that healthcare system capacity and cost-
related variables play a role in the time to reaction has a very relevant implication: they may 
have negatively affected the government’s strategy. Because initial expectations did not match 
reality (otherwise governments would have had not taken hard measures), strong healthcare 
systems generated an over-confidence in the government’s capacity to fight the outbreak. The 
associated economic costs created a fear of excessive economic damage. Both factors delayed 
hard measures, thus increasing the overall resulting cost. Estimating the actual impact on 
fatality and economic costs of agile versus slow policy responses is a question for future 
research, as required data will only be available when the COVID-19 crisis is over.  
There is a wide consensus that strong healthcare capacity improves social welfare, and high 
levels of trade and tourism are important fuelers of economic growth. However, governments 
risk being biased because of these benefits, within the specific context of crisis management 
under incomplete information. As Ballesteros and Kunreuhter (2018, p. 9) warn when analyzing 
organization decision making under uncertainty shocks, “the riskification of uncertainty leads 
to the delusion that increasing formal insurance take-up is a sufficient mechanism to reduce 
vulnerability against uncertainty shocks”. Thus, a relevant policy implication emerges. 
Increasing health expenditure as a consequence of the COVID-19 has emerged as a frequent 
demand. Indeed, this could improve the performance of the health system on regular day-to-
day basis, provided additional capacity meets positive social cost-benefit requirements. 
However, it would not provide full insurance for future potential pandemics management, as it 
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Australia 3/19/2020 Border closure; closure some non-essential shops; 4 square meter rule 
Austria 3/15/2020 Nationwide lockdown, closure of all non-essential shops, ban of public 
gatherings 
Belgium 3/12/2020 Closure of schools (but not universities), discos, cafes and restaurants, and the 
cancellation of all public gatherings for sporting, cultural or festive purposes 
Bulgaria 3/13/2020 Closure of non-essential shops and workplaces, mandatory quarantine for all 
people coming from more affected countries (China, Spain, Italy, Iran, South 
Korea) 
Canada 3/16/2020 Border closure, states of emergency including closure of non-essential shops, 
ban of public gathering, etc. in all Canadian states but Manitoba, New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia 
Chile 3/16/2020 Border closure, state of emergency, partial lockdowns in affected cities and 
regions, closure of schools with at least one case.  
Croatia 3/17/2020 Closure of most non-essential shops, schools and universities; 14-days 
mandatory quarantine for people coming from affected countries, border 
closure 
Cyprus 3/13/2020 Border closure, ban of public gatherings 
Czech Rep. 3/12/2020 Border closure, nationwide curfew, schools suspended, closure of non-essential 
shops 
Denmark 3/11/2020 Closure of schools and universities, banning of public gatherings, home-work 
public sector, border closure 
Estonia 3/13/2020 Border closure, closure of schools, ban of public gatherings, closure of 
recreation and leisure shops 
Finland 3/16/2020 Closure of schools and universities, banning of public gatherings, shut-down of 
most government-run facilities (libraries, etc.) 
France 3/16/2020 Closure of most non-essential shops, ban of public gatherings, closure of 
schools and institutes of higher education, 
Germany 3/16/2020 Closure of education institutions, ban of public gatherings, closure of non-
essential shops in some states 
Greece 3/13/2020 Closure of education institutions, ban of public gatherings, closure of cafes, 
bars, museums, shopping centers, sports facilities and restaurants, border 
closure with limiting countries and affected countries 
Hungary 3/15/2020 Closure of education institutions, bars, restaurants, cafes, public events, border 
closure 
Iceland 3/13/2020 Closure of educational institutions, ban of public gatherings and events 
Ireland 3/24/2020 Closure of education institutions, bars and public houses  
Israel 3/14/2020 Closure of education institutions, most non-essential retail, ban of public 
gatherings  
Italy 3/8/2020 Complete lockdown north Italy, ban public gatherings 
Japan 3/5/2020 Closure of education institutions and extension of the law's emergency 
measures for an influenza outbreak to include COVID-19 
Korea 2/20/2020 Border closure with China, massive testing and surveillance, partial lockdowns 
on more affected areas 
Latvia 3/14/2020 Closure of educational institutions, ban of public events 
Lithuania 3/12/2020 Closure of educational institutions, ban public gatherings, borders closure, 
closure of non-essential shops 
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Luxembourg 3/15/2020 Closure of non-essential shops, ban of public gatherings, closure educational 
institutions 
Mexico 3/26/2020 Closure of non-essential shops and non-essential activities, ban of public 
gatherings, closure educational institutions 
Netherlands 3/15/2020 Closure of educational institutions; closure of cafés, restaurants, sports clubs, 
saunas, sex clubs and coffeeshops, museums; ban of public events  
New Zealand 3/23/2020 Border closure, ban of public gatherings, closure of all venues and enforcement 
of telework whenever possible 
Norway 3/12/2020 Closure of kindergartens, schools, universities, and some none-essential shops 
(bars, restaurants, pubs, clubs, among others) 
Poland 3/11/2020 Closure of all schools and universities, gathering restrictions and closure of 
cultural institutions, such as philharmonic orchestras, operas, theatres, 
museums, and cinemas 
Portugal 3/12/2020 State of emergency; closure of establishments in the hospitality sectors such as 
restaurants, pubs, bars; public gathering restrictions; closure of all education 
institutions (from kindergartens to universities) 
Romania 3/9/2020 Border closure with affected regions; all schools, kindergartens and universities 
closed 
Slovak Rep. 3/15/2020 Implementation of state of emergency with all non-essential stores closed, 
closure of all schools and 14 days quarantine for people arriving from Slovakia 
from Italy, China, South Korea 
Slovenia 3/15/2020 Closure of all educational institutions, bars and restaurants, and gathering 
restriction  
Spain 3/14/2020 State of emergency declared, with closure of all educational institutions, 
hospitality sector establishments. People are to remain locked down in their 
homes except for essential activities 
Sweden 3/27/2020 Reunion right restriction to 50 people 
Switzerland 3/13/2020 Closure of all educational institutions and gathering restriction of more than 
100 people, cancelation of all sport events 
Turkey 3/12/2020 Closure of all schools and universities, travel bans and border closure with 
affected countries 
U. Kingdom 3/18/2020 Closure of all schools, restaurants, pubs, clubs, and indoor leisure facilities 
United States 3/15/2020 State of emergency, >25 states with closure of education institutions, curfew 
population, borders closure (main affected areas, including all UE) 
Serbia 3/15/2020 Closure of all education institutions from kindergartens to universities, ban 
public gathering, border closure  
N.Macedonia 3/11/2020 Closure of all education institutions from kindergartens to universities, border 
closure and ban of public gatherings 
Albania 3/8/2020 Closure of education institutions, gyms, bars and restaurants 
Malta 3/12/2020 Closure of all schools, university and childcare, bars, restaurants and gym, 
mandatory quarantine to travelers from any country 






Table A-2: Correlation Matrix 
  Incidence 
rate 
Healthcare 





Incidence rate at policy response  -      
Healthcare capacity (ppp)  45% -     
Tourism  31% -15% -    
Trade  18% -8% -32% -   
LockedCountries  -19% -57% 9% 12% -  
KmWuhan  17% 4% 7% 16% 7% - 
Note: We include Km from Wuhan because it was used in the Bayesian estimation. 
 
